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THE CREATION AND CONTROL OF EC INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
LESSONS FROM THE ELECTRONICS SECTOR 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper begins by undertaking, a theoretical analysis of EC industrial policy.  This 
will involve selecting definitions and identifying policy instruments, and conclude by 
advancing an industrial policy model with which we may better comprehend 
contemporary EC industrial policy. 
 
Secondly, it is my aim to explore the relationship which exists between the European 
Commission and electronics transnational corporations (TNCS) in the creation and 
control of EC1 industrial policy.  The objective is to understand and to provide a 
framework of analysis for the processes of Comrnission-TNC relations.  This 
necessitates understanding how the various organisations interact and how they 
influence one another2.  This policy-making power interplay is best conceptualised in 
terms of the Pentagonal Diplomacy model.  I acknowledge that other actors, 
especially national governments, are important players in EC industrial policy 
formulation.  I argue however, that EC electronics policy is shaped and guided 
mainly by the Commission and a group of large firms.  This process occurs through 
what Wilks & Wright describe as "informal relationships" [1987:2861, the effects of 
which are often underestimated in analyses of EC industrial policy. 
 
Thirdly, I advance the notion that the emergence and consolidation of an EC 
industrial policy has eroded national sovereignty and contributed to the closer union 
of Europe's nation states.  The 1990 delineation of an explicit industrial policy for the 
European Union has implications which go beyond mere rhetoric.  Member states 
are now obliged to consult each other and coordinate their actions in many spheres.  
This means that the industrial policy competence of the Union should also be 
understood as part of the integration process.  That is, through the Maastricht 
Treaty, the coordination of economic and monetary policies has become central to 
the development of European integration.  The coordination of industrial policies can 
be seen as a flanking dimension of this endeavour. 
                                                          
1
 Following the terminology of the Maastricht Treaty, the term 'European Community' (EC) is employed 
throughout to denote the economic and social "pillar" of the European Union.  This paper does not deal with the 
other two pillars - common foreign and security policy and cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs. 
2
 Stephen Wilks & Maurice Wright (ed) (1 987), Comparative Government-Industry Relations.. 
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Following on from the 1950s creation of a High Authority for coal and steel policy, 
competence has, since the early 1980's, shifted from the national to the European 
level in several other important economic sectors.  This power shift signifies a 
weakening of national government policy autonomy, and a strengthening of 
supranational bodies, most notably the European Commission.  It indicates an 
integration of decision-making power, as well as an irreversible fusing of national 
economic interests for core industrial sectors.  I shall support these assertions with 
evidence from the electronics industry. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
If,'estern Europe, the United States, and Japan, p275, 
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1. THEORIES OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND THE INNOVATION POLICY MODEL  
'Industrial policy' is utilised, in one form or another, by all industrialised and 
industrialising states.  Is it possible though for such a policy to operate at an EC-
Ievel?  The answer would appear to be 'yes'.  Following the publication of the 1990 
Industrial Policy an Open and Competitive Environment European Commission white 
paper, outlining a new Community approach to industrial policy, two consecutive 
meeting of the European Council3 in late 1991 endorsed the approach, and thus, 
gave the EC - for the first time - an explicit mandate in industrial policy. 
 
Academic definitions of industrial policy vary widely.  In fact, it may be argued that 
the concept has neither a clear definition nor measure of success.  Curzon Price 
(1981) advances one of the most inclusive theories as to what makes traditional 
industrial policy.  She argues that industrial policy constitutes all government efforts, 
either individual or in coordinated groups, to "promote or prevent structural change".  
Consequently, Curzon Price states that all of the advanced industrial economies 
have had some form of industrial policy for a long time. 
 
In recent years, a "narrower sense" of industrial policy has emerged in many 
countries.  This may be defined as any selective government measure, or set of 
measures, to prevent or promote structural change on a specific ad hoc basis.  This 
definition comes closest to (although not quite encompassing) the EC policy model 
which we are trying to frame. 
 
Curzon Price argues that 
 
 There are two basic types of industrial policy - whether broadly or narrowly 
defined.  One is positive and forward looking: its aim is to assist the process 
of structural change either by promoting new industries and high technology 
or by helping old ones to 'restructure'.  The other is negative: it attempts to 
slow down, or even prevent, the process of structural change, or more 
bluntly, to keep declining sectors alive through artificial respiration4. 
 
From this, it may be inferred that the National Champions’ policy pursued by many 
EC countries during the 1960s and 1970s was a negative type of industrial policy, 
                                                          
3
 The European Council is a (usually) biannual meeting of the twelve European Community 
member countries heads of government (and head of state, in the case of France) 
4
 ibid.. 
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whereas, the positive form of industrial policy outlined by Curzon Price is more in line 
with the ongoing EC approach.  Hence, it is argued here that it is this more focused, 
or as both Audretsch (1993) and Curzon Price (1981) term it, "selective", form  
of industrial policy which is being employed as a policy framework by the European 
Community.  However, given this "prioritising" nature, and the fact that the sectors of 
priority can be defined almost exclusively as 'high technology', it is conceptually 
desirable to proceed beyond categorising this policy framework as industrial policy in 
the traditional sense of the term.  Therefore, in search of a more specific and 
applicable industrial policy theoretical model, we inevitably arrive at an examination 
of what the OECD first identified5 as 'innovation policy'. 
 
The definition and description of innovation policy expounded here, is based on that 
formulated by Sylvia Ostry (1990), who begins her exposition of innovation policy by 
stressing the fact that  
 
 innovation policy is not a given: it is a policy set, in the making, focused on 
the promotion and adoption of new technology (that is, the commercial 
development of the fruits of basic research).  Thus however much the policy 
mix and institutional structure of 'industry vary from country to country, the 
government-corporate interface is an essential component6. 
 
She continues by arguing that innovation policy has developed since the late 1970s 
as a progressive "spin-off' from, or logical extension of, traditional industrial policy.  
This is because it shifted the emphasis from ailing industries (what Curzon Price 
described as "negative industrial policy") towards a new policy set aimed at 
improving international competitiveness.  Furthermore, recent developments in 
economics (most notably, increasing support for the active role of government, 
espoused most eloquently through the US new trade theory), is creating a conducive 
environment for the fostering of new ideas.  This "new orthodoxy" is establishing a 
'middle way' between the free trade model, and the protectionist school, concerning 
the role of markets visa-vis governments, in both trade and industrial policy, for 
leading-edge, high technology industries7.  Ostry proposes that there is no longer an 
unchallengable belief amongst economists that trade liberalisation always leads to 
national gains. 
                                                          
5
 The term was first used in OECD, Innovation Policy Trends and Perspectives, Paris, 1982 
6
 Sylvia Ostry, Governments and Corporations in a,shrinking World [Trade and Innovation Policies 
in the United,states, Europe, and Japan], 1990, p53 
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Two basic models are identified which encapsulate the fundamental nature of 
innovation policy strategies. 
 
 One seeks to push forward the technological frontier by developing leading-
edge techniques, and the other centers on closing the gap between the 
actual and the best available practice by fostering technology diffusion8. 
 
It is accepted that in reality, most countries innovation policies manifest aspects of 
both of these general strategies.  However, some, most notably the United States, 
are more concerned with advancing the technological frontiers.  Conversely, other 
countries, such as many of the individual west European states (including Ireland), 
tend to focus on efficiently diffusing technology domestically.  The Japanese case is 
exceptional though, in that it provides for the two strategies to a more-or-less equal 
extent, as well as explicitly coordinating them at a government level.  It is within this 
latter, more unique set, that EC innovation policy may be placed. 
 
The EC's mandate for coordinating trade, competition, and technology policies was 
finally clarified and legitimised with the creation of the European Technology 
Community, under the 1986 Single European Act.  This mandate was, of course, 
most explicitly for the (strategically targeted) information technology realm, which 
became the locus of the EC's new innovation policy.  Preoccupation with declining 
competitiveness -especially in the information technology sector- vis-a-vis Japan in 
particular, precipitated a heavy emphasis on the first of the three main domains of 
innovation policy - research and technological development (R&TD), This EC 
coordination of R&TD became the central pillar of EC innovation policy. 
 
The other two policy instruments or structural pillars of EC innovation policy are 
trade, and market structure (competition policy)9.  To expand briefly on these 
important tenets of our policy model, they employ a number of tools through which 
the overall objective of enhancing EC competitiveness is advanced.  These tools, 
within the trade dimension of innovation policy, are: informal pressures (so-called 
"voluntary restraint agreements"), rules of origin, local content requirements, the 
common external tariff, quotas, and most importantly, anti-dumping measures.  All of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
7
 ibid. p60 
8
 ibid. p61 
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these instruments are heavily politicised, and their enactment is generally at the 
discretion of the European Commission.  It is not the intention to get into descriptive 
and critical detail on these policy tools at this time10. 
 
With regards to the third pillar of innovation policy, competition policy, its main 
function is of course antitrust.  As Rosenthal (1990) illustrates, this competence is 
manifest in 
 
 setting and enforcing standards for, firstly, legal business combinations - by 
acquisition or strategic alliance, secondly, anticompetitive market-dominating 
behaviour (monopolisation); and thirdly, collusion between firms that is not 
directed by lawful governmental authority and that adversely affects 
competition in the market11. 
 
Of these second two dimensions of innovation policy, most of the more controversial 
issues arise within the trade pillar however, and generally fall outside the legal 
jurisdiction of competition policy. 
 
A further important and often overlooked aspect of the EC policy framework for 
competitiveness - which falls jointly within the realm of trade and competition policy is 
the Single Market programme.  Broadly speaking, the two fundamental premises of 
this programme are 'deregulation' and 'liberalisation'.  Industry-wide gains from such 
trade-liberating activities would include increased economies of scale and the 
creation of a large, barrier free market.  Liberal economic theory suggests that the 
competitiveness of European-based corporate enterprises would be subsequently 
enhanced.  The achievement of a liberalised, deregulated EC internal market would 
also create a more level playing-field from which EC-based firms could compete with 
their American and Japanese rivals for both European and world market share.  In 
addition, as Howell et al. (1992) point out, the Single Market programme provides the 
European Commission with a further tool of competitiveness - 'trade leverage'. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
9
 The main function of EC competition policy is antitrust.  For further details see for example Howell et al., 
Conflict Among Nations, 1992, pp412-9. 
10
 For a legalistic description of these policy measures, see in particular Howell et.al., Conflict Among Nations, 
1992, pp412-419.  Also, a detailed analysis of anti-dumping can be found in Ostry op.cil 1990, pp39-52 
11
 Douglas E. Rosenthal, "Competition Policy", from Gary Clyde Hufbauer (ed), Europe 1992: An American 
Perspective, p295 
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As it eliminates its internal barriers, the Community has called for "reciprocity" 
and "balance" in the conduct of its external trade, the notion being that third 
countries will be allowed to participate in the Single Market only to the extent 
that the EC enjoys reciprocal access to the markets of their countries12. 
 
The ability of trade leverage to increase market share through greater market access 
is acceptable - if kept general and unquantifiable - and may prove successful in the 
short to medium term.  However, its utility in enhancing competitiveness in the long 
term is questionable, especially if the policy instrument demands a specific market 
share for a given product- 
 
To conclude, innovation policy is generally manifest only in industrialised countries.  
It is aimed more at revitalising or enhancing the competitiveness of an industrial 
(usually high technology) capacity which already exists (and may have been 
competitive previously), than with establishing an initial presence in a given industrial 
sector.  Therefore, innovation policy - particularly with regards to the EC - is aimed at 
long-term, competitive revitalisation.  Central to achieving this objective is of course 
an emphasis on science and technology R&D.  We argue that EC industrial policy for 
knowledge intensive industries, such as electronics, is best understood and analysed 
through the innovation policy model. 
 
2. EC INDUSTRIAL POLICY PARTNERS 
At the close of the 1970s, European Commission Vice President, Viscomte Etienne 
Davignon, initiated a set of meetings with the chief executives of Europe's twelve 
largest native13 electronics firms.  These 'round table' meetings were the first serious 
attempts by the European Commission to establish a close working relationship, at a 
senior level, with a group of transnational enterprises.  It signified a new departure in 
policy-making: both a new policy bargaining axis, and the genesis of European level 
efforts at enhancing the global competitiveness of information technology industries . 
The 1980s witnessed a sea-change in the nature of the agenda-setting and policy-
making processes for the EC electronics sector.  EC policy-making has gone from 
being an intra-institutional consensus-building process, to a multi-sided bargaining 
process.  The role of non-governmental actors in policy formulation and 
                                                          
12
 Howell et al., op cit., pp411-12. 
13
 This paper does not intend to debate the issue of corporate nationality.  For analytical purposes, we apply the 
term 'native' simply to those electronics firms' which have their corporate headquarters within a European 
Community member state 
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implementation has increased significantly since the late 1970s.  In particular, large 
European information technology firms have significantly enhanced their policy 
bargaining position in relation to public sector actors.  Firms have gone from being 
'policy outsiders' to 'policy partners'.  Grant (1987) advances five main roles that 
government has in relation to business.  These are as a policy-maker, as a sponsor, 
as a regulator, as a customer, and as an owner14. Grant omits one key role of 
government however. that of 'partner' with business.  This paper advances the notion 
that EC industrial policy is sometimes created and controlled by a partnership 
between the European Commission and transnational corporations. 
 
Although often diametrically opposed, and never identical, European public policy 
and corporate strategy objectives can converge at certain times, and in specific 
circumstances.  Peterson (1991) supports this conclusion.  He cites the Single 
Market programme as an example of such convergence, arguing that it was 
launched largely because both European governments and industry reached 
consensus on its desirability15. A significant actor which Peterson omits however is 
the European Commission.  We contend that in certain cases, European "state"-firm 
bargaining takes place primarily between firms and EC institutions - national 
governments participating via the EC Council of Ministers.  This is because within the 
EC, much of the policy competence for electronics has shifted since the early 1980s 
from national governments to the European Commission.  This is evident in two main 
policy realms: trade and research and development (R&D).  The Commission's legal 
competence for the external trade affairs of the twelve, combined with the "Research 
& Technology Community" enshrined in the Single European Act, establishes it as 
the primary governmental institution dealing with the activities of the electronics 
industry.  In addition, the Commission's business policing mandate, expressed 
through its competition policy, cedes further authority to Brussels in activities 
concerning industrial actors.  These three policy pillars may be grouped together and 
analysed collectively as 'innovation policy' [Ostry 1990], which we have previously 
discussed. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 Wyn  Grant (with Jane Sargent) (1987), Business and Politics in Britain, p36. 
15
 John Carl Peterson, The Politicv of European Technological Collaboration: An Analysis of the 
Eureka Initiative, PhD thesis, LSE, 1991 
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3. PENTAGONAL POLICY BARGAINS 
Stopford & Strange (1991) and Tucker (1991) argue that contemporary industry -
specific policy is shaped through a process of government-firm bargaining16.  Thus, 
in effect, the entire nature of international economic relations has changed 
fundamentally, as the negotiating power of firms within the international arena, has 
increased significantly.  As Strange (1992) puts it: 
 
governments must now bargain not only with other governments, but also 
with firms and enterprises, while firms now bargain with governments and 
with one another17 
 
Hence, not only has the nature of government-industry relations changed, but as 
Stopford & Strange (1991) conclude, the entire nature of international diplomacy has 
been transformed as "industrial policies and economic management" replace 
conventional military-based foreign policies, as the chief form of inter-state 
competition18.  These authors develop the notion of a 'Triangular Diplomacy' within 
international policy bargaining.  They argue that within the contemporary 
international political economy, the notion of  'diplomacy' must be expanded to 
include power bargaining with and between transnational corporations.  Thus, states 
must now bargain both with each other and with global firms, whilst global firms also 
bargain  with each other [Stopford & Strange 1991: 19-23]. 
 
The 'Pentagonal Diplomacy' notion attempts to expand the Stopford & Strange 
model of state-firm  bargaining in specific applications.  That is to say, when applied 
to the unique institutional structure of the  European Community - which is an 
international setting, given that it consists of fifteen nation states - an extra 
dimension must be added to the bargaining process.  In analysing, within an EC 
context, how firms and governments relate to and negotiate with one another over 
defined mutual goals, one must include another player or level of "governance" 19 
                                                          
16
 The concept of 'bargaining' is taken here as meaning the process whereby "an agreement or contract establishes 
what each party will give, receive, or perform in a transaction between them", Collins English Dictionary, London, 
1979. 
17
 Susan Strange, "States, Firms, and Diplomacy", in International Affairs, 1992 
18
 Susan Strange & John Stopford, Rival,States, Rival Firms, 1991 
19
 The inclusion of "another level of governance and interaction (the European Commission)" into the Stopford & 
Strange model, was propounded by Maria L. Green in her paper, The Politics Of Big Business in the Single Market 
Program, presented for the ECSA Third Biennial Conference, Washington DC, May, 1993.  Ms. Green argued 
that such an inclusion was necessary in applying the triangular diplomacy framework to the Single Market 
programme.  Her argument is in line with that which this author developed in a 1991-95 European University 
Institute PhD thesis.  Ms. Green fails to get into the issue in depth however, and to expand the notion to policy 
bargaining realms beyond the Single Market programme. 
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within the paradigm, i.e. the European Commission.  Thus, two other "angles" must 
be included, to transform Stopford & Strange's triangle into a pentagon20.  
Governments must thus negotiate not only with other governments and with firms, 
but also with the Commission. and firms must bargain with other firms, governments, 
and with the European Commission.  Hence, what emerges is more along the lines 
of 'pentagonal diplomacy', rather than triangular diplomacy [Diagram 1].  Such a five-
sided bargaining structure is complex, because the interplay varies according to the 
specificities of a particular bargain.  In effect, the pentagonal diplomacy concept is a 
framework for analysing and explaining how industrial policy develops within the 
European Community.  It entails five interlinked sets of negotiating bargains: state-
state, firm-firm, state-firm, firm European Commission, and European Commission-
state.  All five bargaining sets come into play for each industry.  However, the policy 
impact of the individual sets varies according to the industry.  Thus, for some 
industries, the firm-Commission interplay is negligible for instance, whilst for others, 
it may be the state-state bargain which has little input into policy development.  The 
intention is to determine which bargaining set(s) dominate a particular policy-making 
process, which of the public and private sector players involved in the policy sphere 
actually define and drive a given policy.  Government-Commission bargaining (which 
is usually an intra-institutional procedure, between the Commission and the Council) 
can be a rigorous ordeal, or it may merely constitute a Council "rubber stamping" of 
a particular policy.  Similarly, Firm Commission negotiating can be central to the 
development of a particular policy, or it may be peripheral, if not irrelevant, to the 
policy process.  Competencies within the EC still vary, and firms can thus end up 
bargaining either with government, with the European Commission, or with both. 
 
Through the Pentagonal Diplomacy conceptual framework, EC industrial policy 
bargains can be comprehensively understood and assessed.  National governments 
for instance, are seen to wield considerable influence in certain realms of EC 
electronics diplomacy.  This is evident in EC policy areas such as Eureka 
coordinated information technology R&D collaborative programmes.  It is also visible 
in EC policy variables, mainly the size of budget allocations and the scope of EC 
technology policy.  However, the actual policy agenda-setting, trade tool utilisation, 
                                                          
20
 European industry associations and European regional governments also feature in this EC bargaining process.  
We include European industry associations within the firm perspective, given that such associations are seldom 
more than the sum of their parts.  European regional governments can often conduct semi-autonomous bargains 
with firms and with the European Commission.  However, in the creation and control of EC policy for the 
electronics industry, we argue that the regions have little or no influence.  They are therefore incorporated under 
the 'state' actor side of the bargaining process. 
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rules governing competition, and concentration of resources, remain largely the 
domain of the European Commission, in partnership with certain large corporate 
enterprises. 
 
4. INDUSTRIAL INTEGRATION THROUGH COLLABORATIVE R&D 
We previously alluded to the fact that in discussing the nature of EC industrial policy, 
one element emerges as the dominant policy tool.  In fact, it may be argued that the 
other "pillars" of the policy (trade instruments and competition policy) are often 
secondary to - and sometimes merely supportive of - the R&D activities.  As 
previously indicated, this emphasis on "knowledge" creation and dissemination is the 
essential part of any innovation policy.  R&D is perhaps the basket within which the 
Commission `places most of its eggs’.  The sheer financial and structural scale of EC 
involvement in research and development is indicative of this policy emphasis.  For 
instance, the EC spends, in total, approximately $2 billion per annum on research, 
much of it on subsidies to collaborative industry programmes.  Also, it concurs with  
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the Commission's stated objective of acting as a "promoter", rather than as a 
"protector".  Although collaborative research is often viewed as a recent 
development, the first European joint research and development project began more 
than quarter of a century ago - into nuclear energy under the 1956 Euratom Treaty21.  
In the early days, the Community's research activities were confined to coal, steel, 
and nuclear energy However, since the mid-1970's, they have gradually been 
extended to other fields Little by little, a Community research and technology policy 
began to evolve.  During the late 1970's, large European firms, attempting to adjust 
to the new global competitive framework, began to perceive a need for cooperation 
                                                          
21
 Paul Taylor cited in The Financial Times, 17 March, 1992. 
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and public policy involvement at an EC, as well as or instead of, at a national level.  
In addition, the EC Commission, through individuals such as Commissioner 
Davignon, saw an increased role for it vis-a-vis large European firms. 
 
A symbolic starting point for large scale EC "high tech industrial policy" activity is 
Davignon's 1979 meetings with the leaders of Europe's 'big twelve' electronics firms.  
As Sharp has argued, "under Davignon's guidance, the Commission began to 
develop a more strategic approach to the IT sector" [ 1 989: 202].  The creation of a 
"round table", comprising both EC officials and industrialists22, was intended to jointly 
devise ways in which the Community could help restructure Europe's high 
technology industries through research. 
 
Therefore, from the early 1980's, one could witness a significant transformation in 
the nature of European industrial policies.  As Sharp (1989) argues, 
 
While the 1960's and 1970's could well be called the Age of the National 
Champion, the 1980's may earn the title the Age of Collaboration23. 
 
The early 1980's proved a period of policy transition in the EC; with an expanded role 
for Community institutions - primarily the Commission.  Such a role was sometimes 
in tandem with and often at the expense of, national government - depending on the 
industrial sector in question.  The power shift was most obvious within information 
technology industries - where the need for global competitivity and greater 
economies of scale was most evident.  Also, this was illustrative of an extension of 
Community research activities from more traditional industries such as coal and 
steel, into the new knowledge intensive industries.  Thus, driven by the necessity of 
expanding their economies of scale and sharing R&D costs, western European 
states ceded considerable policy authority in information technology to Brussels.  
Business supported this power shift, seeing benefits to be had in a larger "home" 
market, greater trans-European cooperative linkages, and more sources of 
governmental R&D support.  As Mazey & Richardson (1 993) argue, 
 
                                                          
22
 The corporate members of Davignon's round table were ICL, GEC, Plessey, AEG, Nixdorf, 
Siemens, Thomson, Bull, CGE,, Olivetti, STET, and Philips. 
23
 Margaret Sharp (1 989), 'Corporate Strategies and Collaboration: The Case of ESPRIT and 
European Electronics', in Mark Dodgson (ed), Technology Strategy and the Firm.. Management and 
Public Policy, p202. 
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increasingly, groups themselves have recognised the logic and momentum of 
greater Europeanization of solutions24. 
 
Finally, the European Commission actively sought this new policy competency, 
arguing that competitiveness could best be achieved if policy was implemented at a 
European level.   
 
From the early 1980s, the Community's participation in R&D had two separate and 
distinct manifestations: firstly, through its financial involvement in pan-European 
Eureka25 projects. and secondly, through the EC's own Framework Programmes.  
With this two-pronged technology policy, the Community have placed inordinate 
industrial policy emphasis on knowledge creation and dissemination.  From a 
legalistic standpoint, the formulation and entry into force of the Single European Act, 
was a significant landmark in the development of EC technology policy, giving it a 
legal basis in the Treaty of Rome, Through the SEA, a European Research and 
Technology Community was established, and the Community was given specific 
powers in the field of scientific and technical cooperation, primarily under the 
auspices of the Framework Programme of research and development. 
 
The special "strategic" role accorded to science and technology in general, and 
information technology in particular, was described during the 1980s by EC 
Commission Vice-President, Karl Heinz Nades: 
 
 It was not until 1980 that the Community was able to take a strategic view of 
science and technology.  It was then that that the Commission first stated its 
belief that it was not possible to devise a new model for society, to secure 
Europe's political and economic autonomy, or to guarantee commercial 
competitiveness, without a complete mastery of the most sophisticated 
technologies26. 
 
Furthermore, Narjes argued that the Community had a responsibility to "strengthen 
the scientific and technological basis of European industry", in addition to actively 
                                                          
24
 Sonia Mazey & Jeremy Richardson, Lobbying in the European Community, 1993, p252. 
25
 The European Research Coordination Agency (EUREKA) was launched by seventeen European countries and 
the European Commission in 1985, in an effort to improve the global competitiveness of Europe's industries and 
economies through collaborative high technology R&D. 
26
 Karl Heinz Narjes, Europe's Technological Challenge: A View From the European Commission, Science and 
Public Policy, December 1988, p396. 
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encouraging industry to become more responsive to the global competitive 
environment.  Thus, it is obvious that at the most senior levels of EC industrial policy 
making during the 1980's, an active interventionist view was taken towards European 
high tech industrys' competitive enhancement. 
 
Policy styles changed as the EC entered the 1990s.  The main policy document 
outlining this new Community role, is the 1990 Industrial Policy In An Open and 
Competitive Environment report.  Internal Commission sources27 argue that this 
document is indicative of the more liberal tendencies within the Commission.  It is 
seen as a victory for liberalism over interventionism.  The document's initial 
argument is that a growing consensus has emerged on the type of policy needed to 
lay down the conditions for a strong and competitive industry' [CEC 1990: 1 1. This 
consensus derives from the experience of Community policies operational since the 
mid- 1980's The implicit argument is that it has been recognised within the 
Commission that the top-down and heavily interventionist policies of the 1980's have 
not succeeded in enhancing competitiveness; and thus, a new post-interventionist 
policy set, with emphasis on global competitiveness, is needed.  The communique 
goes on to state that the 'role of public authorities is above all a catalyst and 
pathbreaker for innovation.  The main responsibility for industrial competitiveness 
must lie with firms themselves, but they should be able to expect from public 
authorities clear and predictable conditions for their activities'. 
 
There is nothing new in this argument.  To say that the ultimate onus for 
competitiveness is on firms themselves, is to blandly state the obvious.  To say that 
this firm responsibility should be extensively supported by the public sector, is to 
focus on the real issue.  The Commission acknowledges that firms compete for world 
market share but it argues that they cannot do so alone.  Thus, a middle-way is 
advocated, between government directed firm strategy and free market competition.  
The result is policy partnership. 
 
5. THE MAIN POLICY ACTORS FOR ELECTRONICS 
The EC industrial policy bargaining process for electronics comprises five categories 
of actor: firstly, on the Commission side, Directorate-Generals Xlll 
(Telecommunications, Information Market and Exploitation of Research), 111 
(Internal Market & Industry), Xll (Science & Research), and to a slightly lesser extent, 
                                                          
27
 Interview conducted with senior Commission official, Brussels, February, 1994. 
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I (External Relations)28, and IV (Competition Policy). secondly, on the Council of 
Nfinisters side, assorted national government departments and COREPER (national 
permanent representatives to the Community). thirdly, the European Parliament, on 
budgetary issues. fourthly, university and private research laboratories; and finally, 
most of the leading European-based electronics firms. 
 
 
EC Policy-Bargaining for Electronics:  the Actors 
 
Big Business European Commission 
Individual firms & industry associations 
 
DG’s XIII, XII, IV, III, I 
   
   
   
 Policy  
             
   
   
   
   
European Parliament Council of Ministers University/Private Labs 
 National government depts  
& COREPER 
 
 
 
 
Of these, earlier research29 suggests that the most important actors are Directorate-
Generals 1, 111, IV, and XIII of the European Commission, and the large European 
electronics firms. 
 
One can see that the process has become more complex, as the number of actors 
that influence the policy bargaining procedure has increased.  It may be argued that 
more checks and balances now exist on and within the Commission, and the general 
policy-making process is more transparent and inclusive.  However, this fact does 
                                                          
28
 Directorate-General I is included here due to its competency for trade tools such as anti-dumping. 
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not appear to have exposed the weaknesses inherent in this policy, nor altered its 
broadly interventionist nature. 
 
6. THE FIRM AS A POLICY ENTREPRENEUR 
Mason (1992) argues that for cars, EC policy-making is a member state-dominated 
process.  Thus, in theoretical terms, he comes down on the side of the neo-realists, 
perceiving the EC as a loose network of inter-state bargains, controlled by national 
governments.  Governments dominate the European Commission, and not the other 
way around, as neo-functionalists might have you believe. 
 
This paper subscribes to a different principle from both the neo-functionalist and 
neo-realist schools.  This approach attributes influence to both sources of political 
authority (EC and national), within the policy  bargaining process.  However, for the 
electronics industry, the process is dominated by EC institutions, in conjunction with 
large firms.  As Green (1993) argues, neither intergovernmentalism nor neo-
functionalist  theory takes account of the firm as an actor within EC policy-making30.  
Neither is sufficient to analyse  recent EC policy-making for industry, as neither can 
adequately explain the increased influence of the firm  within this process.  
 
Other academic studies support our emphasis on the central role that firms play 
within (EC) policy-making.  From their study of European government-industry 
relationships in both the telecommunications and consumer electronics sector, 
Cawson et al. found that  
 
even where governments were acting strategically in the promotion of 
industries and products, outcomes were ultimately decided by the strategies 
of firms [1990: 361]. 
 
Firm bargaining power was particularly strong in situations where governmental 
actors set 'performance' objectives, such as the competitive enhancement of the 
domestic electronics industry.  In these situations, government is trying to set both 
the policy means and ends - a situation which gives more bargaining power to the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
29
 Thomas C. Lawton (1995), Technology and the New Diplomacy: the Creation and Control of EC 
IndustrialPolicy,  chpt 4. 
30
 Neo-functionalism does propose a coalition between supranational organisations such as the Commission, and 
business interests.  However, this approach envisages a political alliance between the European Commission for 
instance, and business associations.  This alliance would be primarily intended to supercede the nation-state and 
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corporate actors, without whose specific actions the policy ends could not be 
achieved [Cawson et al. 1990: 3621.  This supports our argument concerning the 
role of firms in EC policy for the electronics industry.  Such policy has specified 
'performance' objectives (competitive enhancement), thus giving electronics 
producers greater policy bargaining strength relative to EC governmental agents.  
Similarly, June (1992) argues that large firms occupy centre stage in the creation 
and control of EC policy for areas such as trade and the environment.  He argues 
that they influence policy-making both through their economic activity, and through 
their political interventions [1992: 23].  These transnational corporations get directly 
involved in policy development when their interests are at stake, or when their 
cooperation is needed in order to implement specific measures: 
 
 Their relationship with the Commission (and national political bodies) implies 
more than that of the normal lobbyists who try to impose their vision on 
government.  Representatives of MNCs are often called in by government (or 
the  Commission, for that matter) because of their indepth knowledge of 
specific affairs which civil servants would lack  [June 1992: 24]. 
 
George Ross (1993; 1995) substantiates this argument.  As an observer within the 
Delors Cabinet during 1991, he witnessed first-hand the direct and high level 
relationship which existed between the Commission and the European electronics 
industry.  Frequent meetings occurred between President Delors and the Chief 
Executive Officers (CE0s) of some of Europe's industrial giants31.  The overall 
objective for both parties was to halt the competitive decline of the indigenous 
European electronics industry.  Delors participated in such meetings because he 
believed in the need for a corporate input into industrial policy formulation.  He 
listened even more attentively to the electronics firms because of their implicit threats 
to withdraw their political support for the Community (and thus for the integration 
process) if their views were not adequately accounted for in the policy-making 
process [Ross 1995: 115-61.  Not only did the Commission fear losing the 
confidence of European business (and thus losing power vis-a-vis national 
governments) but as several observers have argued32, the Commission saw 
                                                                                                                                                                      
further the development of a federal Europe.  There is no real conceptualisation of individual firms, or an alliance 
of individual firms, attempting to advance their own agendas through bargaining with political actors. 
31
 George Ross (1 995) describes the high level Commission-industry relationships, in Jacques Delors 
and European Integration, pp 1 15-6. 
32
 Most notably, the United States Office of Technology Assessment in their 1991 report on competitiveness, and 
Forum Europe in a 1992 document released by them. 
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European industry - especially high technology sectors - as potential allies in the 
struggle to achieve a federal Europe.  The Commission endeavoured to create a 
common area of action for European industrial affairs and electronics was at the 
forefront of this undertaking.  Moreover, the Commission purposefully "courted" big 
business, seeing them as important allies in the European integration process.  This 
policy partnership for EC industrial policy has contributed to the erosion of national 
sovereignty amongst the member states of the European Union. 
 
7. SOME POLICY CONSEQUENCES 
How can one rate the "partnership" between EC governmental actors and industry in 
creating competitive advantage for specific European information technology 
sectors?  More particularly, how is EC policy affecting the competitiveness of 
European electronics producers? 
 
The 'Porter Diamond’33 was created as a means of conceptualising the interrelated 
components which together comprise a nation's competitive advantage.  For Porter 
(1990), government's role in establishing competitive advantage for an industry is to 
stimulate improvement and innovation domestically.  He stresses that it is up to the 
industry alone to actually compete though.  Thus, the Diamond advances four 
attributes which shape the domestic competitive environment for corporate 
enterprises, and by extension, enhance or hinder the domestic firms' 
competitiveness in the global market In brief, they are factor conditions (e.g. skilled 
workforce), demand conditions (e.g. sufficient domestic economies of scale), related 
and supporting industries (e.g. having a software industry in addition to a computer 
hardware industry), and firm strategy,structure, and rivalry (e.g. regulatory systems 
such as EC competition policy)34.  These four Porter Diamond attributes comply 
perfectly with the present EC policy approach for electronics.  This is actually not a 
surprise.  In searching for a more acceptable policy structure, the European 
Commission set upon Porter's model, correctly seeing it as en vogue amongst large 
segments of the international business and governmental community.  One can see 
Porter's concepts throughout the 1990 Industrial Policy in an Open and Competitive 
Environment Commission report.  Indeed, his competitive advantage model is 
mentioned by name in the document.  Policies have been implemented for human 
capital development ('factor conditions'), sufficient economies of scale, through the 
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 Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations,  1990. 
34For further details on these attributes, and on the 'Porter Diamond in general, see Porter.  The 
Competitive Advantage of Nations,, 1990. 
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Single Market programme ('demand conditions'), developing links between 
enterprises at different stages in the production cycle, and encouraging the 
development of indigenous semiconductor design and equipment manufacturers 
('related and supporting industries’'), and, through competition policy, to regulate 
corporate structure and behaviour ('firm strategy, structure, and rivalry'). 
 
Thus, if one sees any utility in the Porter model and if it has been applied to the EC 
policy structure, why has competitiveness not improved? 
 
The answer lies in the important extra-Diamond variable, government.  As argued 
previously, government (or governmental actors such as the European Commission-
fission) should not attempt to control competitive advantage.  If it does, the 
competitive diamond will be distorted.  Although unable to control competitive 
advantage, there is no denying the influence which public policy can have on said 
phenomenon [Porter 19901.  Therefore, the argument here is that the overall thrust 
of EC policy has failed to enhance the global competitiveness of the European 
electronics industry because it has been overly interventionist and frequently directed 
at the wrong areas.  Thus, using Porter's model, one can argue that the nature and 
extent of EC policy has upset the balance of the Diamond and adversely affected the 
competitiveness of European electronics producers.  We suggest a number of ways 
in which the Community could change its overall policy structure.  These include the 
abolition of trade tools such as antidumping, rules of origin, and import tariffs, which 
merely protect uncompetitive European-based firms. the phasing out of large 
collaborative R&D programmes which are administered by the Commission; greater 
emphasis on funding of basic research within the framework of the industry-led 
Eureka initiative. and more promotional assistance - through training schemes, 
technological diffusion, etc. - for start-ups and young SMEs' within the electronics 
industry. 
 
Such changes may reinforce the Diamond and finally permit the creation of a viable 
domestic competitive environment for European producers.  After that, it is up to the 
firms themselves to build competitive advantage and capture greater global market 
share. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
The power interplay between various actors involved in the formulation of EC 
industrial policy can best be understood and analysed through the Pentagonal 
Diplomacy policy bargaining model.  As this model suggests, for certain industries, 
EC industrial policy is determined jointly by corporate and governmental agents.  
Several previous studies support this notion of large firms partly creating EC policy 
[June 1992.  Green 19931.  Ross lends further support to the argument that EC 
electronics policy has been shaped by a Commission-large firm partnership.  He 
reveals that a number of large electronics companies have been directly involved in 
the creation of EC policy for this sector [1995:115-61] 
 
It is difficult - if not impossible - to establish the impact which a policy has on a firm.  
This is particularly true for R&D policies.  The counterfactual proves insurmountable 
in any assessment of "competitive enhancement" resulting from R&D policy.  
Similarly,, it is difficult to gauge the precise effect of trade tools on corporate market 
performance.  Whilst not being able to assign definitive "success" or "failure" labels 
to EC policy tools, electronics policy has not had the desired effect on industry.  This 
may mean that policy has had no obvious impact, either positively or negatively; or it 
may mean that a policy has distorted market forces in a way which can hinder 
competition. 
 
As regards EC industrial policy for the electronics industry, it is suggested that in the 
medium to long term, too much collaboration can become collusive, sustain or create 
oligopolies, and therefore adversely affect competitiveness [Mytelka 19911.  Thus, 
EC electronics policy has market distorting elements.  A remedy might be to restrict 
or abolish trade tools such as antidumping practices, rules of origin, local content 
requirements, and import tariffs, which merely protect uncompetitive (former national 
champion) European firms.  Further restructuring of collaborative R&D initiatives may 
also contribute to a more competitive European-based electronics industry. 
 
From the late 1970s, the European Commission began to broaden its industrial 
affairs competency.  From its traditional industrial policy domains of coal, steel, and 
nuclear energy, the Commission sought a competency in newer industries which 
were of core economic value to Community member states.  It thus focused its 
efforts on those groups of industries comprising the information technology sector.  
The Commission successfully acquired considerable policy power from national 
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governments through developing a type of knowledge-oriented industrial policy 
known as innovation policy, and concentrating this policy on information technology 
industries such as electronics.  Thus, EC industrial policy for the electronics industry 
evolved as part of the Community's efforts to create a common area of action for 
industrial affairs.  This is evident from the 1979 Davignon 'round table' meetings with 
electronics leaders, through the creation of the EC-directed Framework and ESPRIT 
R&D programmes and EC involvement in Eureka, culminating in the 1990, 1991 and 
1994 EC industrial policy documents, wherein electronics are explicitly targeted for 
"special treatment".  Large electronics firms have gone from being policy outsiders 
until the late 1970's, to being policy partners since the early 1980s.  Their senior 
executives are consulted by and negotiate with governmental actors on policy 
decisions.  It is reasonable to assume that this firm-Commission interplay is also an 
important variable in the policy-making process for other business sectors.  Thus, 
any contemporary analysis of EC industrial policy should take account of the 
Commission-TNC relationship in the policy-making process. 
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